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(GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) is to promote free trade between
member states. Nonetheless, an exhaustive study of bilateral merchandise trade based
on a large panel data set led Rose (2004) to conclude that there is no compelling
empirical evidence to show that GATT/WTO membership does actually encourage
international trade. This unanticipated finding generated a great deal of attention
in the literature and several scholars put forward various explanations for it. In this
paper we set up a new international trade data set which, unlike Rose’s, allows us
to model exports and imports separately and to study the extensive margin of trade,
i.e., the number of bilateral trade relationships. Using this data set and a gravity
framework, first we demonstrate how to obtain puzzling negative results and so explain
the previous unintuitive findings. Then we show that GATT/WTO membership does
indeed encourage international trade, so the most obvious reason for Rose’s negative
outcome is the lack of zero bilateral trade observations in his data set.
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1. Introduction
New data sets which are becoming larger, richer, more informative and more reliable
by the day, combined with the latest econometric and modeling tools, urge the
revision of many old problems and questions that have previously been assumed to
be satisfactorily answered. A case in point is in modeling international trade. Since
the pioneering studies of Tinbergen [1962] and Pyhnen [1963] the gravity model has
been the workhorse in this field. Its popularity is partly due to its empirical success in
capturing the impact of trade liberalization and in assessing the effect of geographic
regions and international agreements on trade.
Probably the best known examples for these agreements are the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was first signed by 23 countries in 1947, and
its successor the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was established in 1995 and
currently has 153 member countries. Their declared objective is to promote free trade
between member states. Even so, in his recent seminal paper Rose (2004) argued that
in spite of this wishful thinking, conventional wisdom and casual empiricism, there is
no compelling empirical evidence to support the widespread claim that GATT/WTO
membership has actually encouraged international trade. However, the fact that time-
after-time existing and acceding countries alike are willing to cover the increasing costs
of accession clearly suggests a strong belief that it will promote trade between them
(Felbermayr and Kohler [2007]).
Unsurprisingly, Rose (2004) attracted many critiques which focused primarily
on: pooling developed and developing countries; the classification of participating
and non-participating countries; multilateral resistance to trade; the neglect of
the extensive margin of trade; the selection of the dependent variable; and the
specification and estimation of the econometric model. We believe that there is merit
in all of these critiques, although we also feel that the positive impact of GATT/WTO
on trade should reveal itself quite straightforwardly. We perform our analyses on
a new, updated international trade data set which has two major advantages over
Rose’s: it contains zero trade flows; and separately includes both export and import
flows. The coverage of our sample is slightly larger than that of Rose’s (180 countries),
but its time span is a bit shorter (46 years). The temporal sample size is restricted
so that the required measurements be as homogenous, reliable and comparable as
possible.
Thus the key aim of this study is to shed some light on the puzzling findings
of Rose (2004), who found little compelling evidence that GATT/WTO membership
encourages trade. Using a range of techniques, we find unequivocal evidence to the
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contrary, and that Rose’s (2004) findings are probably attributable to the lack of zero
bilateral trade flows in his data set.
2. Benchmark Study: Rose(2004)
In order to assess the effect of GATT/WTO membership on bilateral trade, Rose
(2004) used a standard gravity model augmented by a number of conditioning
variables related to culture, geography, history, and international trade agreements.
The specification of the model was:
lnARTijt = β0 + β1 ln(RGDPit ×RGDPjt) + β2 ln
(
RGDPit
POPit
×
RGDPjt
POPjt
)
+ β3 lnDISTij + β4 ln(LANDi × LANDj) + β5CLANGij + β6CBORDij
+ β7NLLOCKijβ8NISLANDij + β9EV COLij + β10COMCOLij
+ β11ISCOLijt + β12CNATij + β13MUNIijt + β14RTAijt + γ1ONEINijt
+ γ2BOTHINijt + γ3GSPijt +
∑
ϕtY Dt + εijt
(1)
where ln denotes the natural logarithm and i denotes source country, j target
country and t time period (year). The variables are defined as: ART - average
real bilateral trade between countries; RGDP - real GDP; POP -population; DIST -
great circle distance; LAND- land areas; CLANG- dummy variable for common
language; CBORD- dummy variable for common land border; NLLOCK- number
of landlocked countries in the country pair; NISLAND- number of island countries;
EV COL- dummy variable for ever colonized; COMCOL- dummy variable for com-
mon colonizer; ISCOL- dummy variable for colonizing; CNAT - dummy variable
for common nation; MUNI- dummy variable for monetary union; RTA- dummy
variable for regional trade agreement; ONEIN - dummy variable for one country
in GATT/WTO; BOTHIN - dummy variable for both countries in GATT/WTO;
GSP - dummy variable for Generalized System of Preferences; and Y D- year dummy
variable.
Whilst the coefficients, β1, . . . , β4 are elasticities, β5, . . . , β14 and γ1, γ2, γ3 are
semi-elasticities. One would expect richer countries; countries that share a language,
land border, or colonial history; countries that belong to the same trading group,
monetary union, or have some special bilateral agreement; all to trade more with
each other. On the other hand, countries that are far apart, or geographically larger
are likely to trade less. Whether being landlocked or an island nation encourages
trade or not seems to be ambiguous.
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Turning to the key variables in this study (ONEIN and BOTHIN) if
GATT/WTO membership has a positive effect on trade, one would expect these
variables to have positive coefficients (γ1 and γ2) and the latter to dominate. On the
other hand, if these variables represent ‘trade diversion’ and ‘trade creation’ effects
of GATT/WTO membership, then one would expect γ1 < 0 and γ2 > 0 (although
γ1 could still be positive due to the externalities of GATT/WTO on non-member
countries).
Rose [2004] estimated this model using a two-dimensional (country-pair and time)
unbalanced panel data set for 175 countries over the 1948-1999 sample period. The
data were collected from various sources.4 Most importantly, average real bilateral
trade (ART ) between any given pair of countries was calculated by taking the
arithmetic mean of merchandise exports (f.o.b., free on board) and imports (c.i.f.,
cost, insurance and freight) in both directions, i.e., of potentially four different
measures. The nominal data on exports and imports in US dollars were taken from
the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and were deflated by the US CPI for all urban
consumers (1982-84 = 100). Population (POP ) and real GDP (RGDP ) data came
from three sources: the Penn World Tables; the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators; and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Data on GATT/WTO
membership (ONEIN , BOTHIN) were obtained from the WTO’s web site, and on
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP ) from the UN’s Operation and Effects of
the Generalized System of Preferences booklets (published in 1974, 1979, and 1984).
Rose’s ‘default’ OLS results are reproduced in Table 1. Overall, the results seem
to be statistically satisfactory, the model explains close to 2/3 of the total variation
in bilateral trade, and the significant coefficients have the expected signs. However,
the GATT/WTO membership dummy variables are insignificant. In order to see how
robust this finding was, Rose (2004) experimented with alternative specifications,
estimation methods, subsets of countries, and sample periods, and concluded that
none of the eighty-plus regressions lent support to the hypothesis that GATT/WTO
membership systematically encourages trade.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
In the ‘Country fixed effects’ column of Table 1 we report only one of these regressions
based on model (1) augmented with country specific fixed effects.5 Compared to the
4 The exact data sources can be found in Rose [2004], p. 101.
5 At one stage Rose [2004], p. 100 mentions that “unless otherwise noted, fixed and
random effects are always country-pair specific”, but he must have used country
specific fixed effects since a set of country-pair dummy variables would be perfectly
multicollinear with all those independent variables which change in the ij dimension
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‘default’ results, the qualitative effect of these fixed effects is striking: the coefficient of
BOTHIN too became significantly positive. It suggests that bilateral trade between
two GATT/WTO members is expected to be about 16% more than between non
members.6 Although Rose [2004], p. 104 light-heartedly dismissed this finding on
the ground that the estimated effect of GATT/WTO membership on trade is small
compared to other effects, it still raises doubts about Rose’s (2004) overall conclusion.
3. Follow-up Studies and Related Literature
Since its publication, Rose [2004] has attracted much attention and inspired a new field
of research that focuses on the impact of trade treaties and organizations. Specifically,
the outright rejection of a positive link between GATT/WTO membership and
bilateral trade attracted many critiques. A number of potential reasons behind
this seemingly implausible negative result have been raised in the literature, some
of them related to the data set, others to the specification and estimation of the
gravity equation.7 In this section we briefly consider the six most relevant of them
in turn (homogeneity of group members, formal and informal membership, absolute
and relative trade barriers, endogeneity, zero trade flows and heteroskedasticity).
First, although the GATT/WTO was set up to promote world trade, in terms
of trade policy the formal members have never been, and are not currently, a
homogeneous group of countries neither in comparison to each other nor to non-
members. This is partly due to the fact that prior to 1994 developing countries
wishing to accede were not required to reduce their own trade barriers significantly,
and that many developing countries are net exporters of fuels and minerals which
traditionally face relatively low tariffs in developed countries. Consequently, the
impact of GATT/WTO membership is likely to be greater on trade for developed
countries, but this impact might be blurred in a mixed sample of developed and
developing countries.
This is one of the key arguments of Subramanian and Wei [2007]. Similarly
to Rose, they relied on a gravity equation, but they distinguished developed and
but not in time, as for example, DISTij . However, country specific fixed effects do
not fit naturally into a country-pair and time framework and their application tacitly
assumes that the group of country specific variables that are not considered explicitly
has a constant impact on a country’s international trade; let it be export or import and
irrespectively of the trading partner.
6 ARTijt,BOTHIN=1
ARTijt,BOTHIN=0
− 1 = e0.15 − 1 = 0.1618.
7 See Piermartini and Teh [2005], pp. 47-52 for a brief summary. This review and the
related articles make reference to several unpublished manuscripts, but whenever it is
possible we rely on their final paper versions.
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developing GATT/WTO member countries. Moreover, since the relevant trade
theories focus on unidirectional trade rather than total trade, their dependent variable
was imports by country i from country j (as opposed to the average of the four
potential flows between them). Finally, in order to proxy for ‘multilateral trade
resistance’ in a panel data context, following Anderson and van Wincoop [2003], they
augmented equation (1)with time-varying importer and exporter fixed effects and
dropped the country-specific variables.
Using an updated version of Rose’s data set,8 containing five-yearly observations
between 1950 and 2000 inclusively, Subramanian andWei [2007] managed to show that
GATT/WTO membership had a statistically significant and economically substantial
positive effect on world trade, amounting to about 120 percent of additional world
trade. This impact, however, is uneven: it is important for the imports of developed
countries, for trade in the non-protected sectors, and for the new members, but it is
marginal for the imports of developing countries, for trade in the protected sectors,
and for the long term members.
A second thematic critique of Rose was investigated by Tomz et all [2007]. The
tenet here was that many countries aspiring for membership enjoyed preferential
treatment, most favored nation status, or voluntarily reduced their own trade barriers
before accession, while member countries were allowed fairly lengthy transition periods
for tariff reduction (usually 5 to 10 years); and that GATT/WTO agreements, rights
and obligations have been applied not only to formal members but also to non-member
participants, such as colonies, newly independent states and provisional members.9
Using the same data and methods as Rose but classifying countries by actual par-
ticipation rather than formal membership, they showed that GATT/WTO increased
the trade of both formal members and non-member participants substantially. In
particular, according to the benchmark specification, compared with countries outside
the agreement, trade is about 31 percent higher when one of the two trading partners
participates in GATT/WTO, and it is 72 percent higher when both trading partners
participate.10
8 The observations for the new dependent variable, imports, were obtained directly from
the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, while observations for variables not present in
equation (1) were obtained from additional UN sources (TRAINS and COMTRADE
databases).
9 According to Tomz et. all [2007] p. 2016, “Over half of the observations that Rose
classified as involving no GATT members actually involved countries that were bound
by the agreement.”
10 Strangely, however, non-member participation seems to have a larger positive impact
on trade than formal membership.
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Third, Anderson and van Wincoop [2003] argued that bilateral trade is affected
not simply by the absolute trade barriers between the two countries, but by the
relative trade barriers, i.e., by the barriers between them relative to the average
trade barriers they face with all their trading partners. For this reason, equation (1)
has to be augmented with some multilateral resistance terms which are functions of
all bilateral trade barriers. In practice, these terms are often proxied with remoteness
variables, though according to Anderson and van Wincoop [2003] they are rather
related to some unobservable implicit price indices of the trading partners. The main
contribution of this paper is the development of a theory-consistent gravity equation.
However, for illustration, the authors estimated their model for the 10 provinces of
Canada and 30 states of the US that account for about 90 percent of trade between
these two countries using 1993 data and showed that the McCallum border puzzle is
mainly due to model misspecification.11
Fourth, Rose tacitly assumed that all right-hand side variables in equation (1) are
determined exogenously. However, obvious candidates for endogeneity are the GDPs
of the partner countries which, by definition, include trade balances. This might not
be a major problem though because net exports are typically fairly small compared
to GDP and the shares of individual bilateral trade flows are even smaller (Baier and
Bergstrand [2007], p. 79. A potentially more serious endogeneity bias is due to the
fact that GATT/WTO or RTA membership might be influenced by bilateral trade
flows and that countries “self-select” themselves into these “treatment” variables.12
Magee [2003] also considered the possible presence of endogeneity in gravity
models and accordingly used instrumental variables (IV) in a cross-sectional model.
Baier and Bergstrand [2007], however, rejected the IV method for addressing endo-
geneity bias in cross-sectional gravity models due to unconvincing instrument validity.
Instead, they advocated the use of panel data (in levels) with country-pair and
country-and-time fixed effects; or first-differenced panel data with country-and-time
fixed effects. Based on five-yearly data13 from 1960 to 2000 for 96 countries, the
results of Baier and Bergstrand indicate that, on average, a free trade agreement
increases partner country trade by about 100% after 10 years.
11 The so called border puzzle refers to McCallum [1995] finding that intranational trade
among Canadian provinces in 1988 was more than twenty times larger than international
trade between country-regionplaceU.S. states and Canadian provinces.
12 Trefler [199]) and Lee and Swagel [1997] focused on a similar endogeneity bias in
estimating the effect of non-tariff barriers on trade flows.
13 Nominal trade flows from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and nominal GDP from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators had been scaled by GDP deflators,
while the data for most other variables were compiled from the CIA’s WorldFactbook.
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The next issue related to Rose’s findings is to do with the issue of zero trade
observations. The log-linear specification gravity equations require that all trade
flow observations be positive. This is an important restriction because about half
of all country pairs do not trade with each other at all, while many others do but
relatively little so in the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (and similar data banks)
their bilateral trade flows are recorded as zero. Unfortunately, in these datasets the
‘genuine’ and ‘rounded’ zeros cannot be distinguished, and it is similarly impossible
to distinguish between zero and missing trade flows.
A simple pragmatic solution to zero observations in general is to increase all
trade flow measurements by a small amount, as for example in Harris et. all [2002].14
Yet, Rose and several other empirical studies rather dropped zero trade observations
and focused on those country pairs and time periods for which positive trade flows
were recorded. Among others, Helpman et al [2008] and Felbermayr and Kohler
[2006] criticized this practice because by considering the intensive margin of trade (the
growth of trade in existing relationships) but ignoring the extensive margin of trade
(the change in the number of bilateral trade relationships) these studies produced
biased estimates with dubious interpretations.
To avoid this bias, Helpman et al [2008] proposed a simple two-equation model,
along the lines of Heckman [1979], based on differentiated products and heterogeneous
firms. They implemented three two-stage estimation procedures that make use of
the information contained not only in the data of trading partners but that of non-
trading countries too: a fully parameterized non-linear least squares (NLS) method;
a semi-parametric method; and a non-parametric method. In each case, the first
stage involved the estimation of a probit selection equation of the trading partners
and subsequently the predicted probabilities of trading were used in the second stage
estimation of a gravity equation with importing and exporting country fixed effects.
The results based on the real exports between 158 countries in 1986 indicate that the
traditional estimates are biased and that most of the bias is due to the oversight of
14 Although in theory this data manipulation results in inconsistent estimates, if the
constant is indeed small relative to the positive trade flows, then one would expect
the asymptotic biases to be small. Still, Silva and Tenreyro [2006] advised against this
procedure because according to their cross-sectional simulation study the performance
of the OLS estimator for the log-linear version of a constant elasticity model where the
dependent variable is the log of (yi +1) is rather poor. It has to be mentioned though,
that in these simulations the expected value of yi was only 1.49, not much larger than
the additive constant.
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the extensive margin of trade.15 Yet, the rapid growth of world trade from 1970 to
1997 was predominantly due to the growth on the intensive margin of trade.
Felbermayr and Kohler [2006] highlighted the importance of the extensive margin
by showing that while exporter and importer fixed effects alone are insufficient to solve
Rose’s GATT/WTO puzzle, a probit gravity equation indicates that the probability
to find an existing trade relationship is about 10 percentage points higher for two
GATT/WTO member countries than for two non-members. A similar, though
numerically smaller estimate resulted from the Tobit approach to a gravity model
characterized by corner-solutions, meaning that in any given relationship bilateral
trade is supposed to be equal to its full potential if it exceeds some threshold level,
and zero otherwise.
The final potential estimation problem is related to heteroskedasticity, which is
almost inevitably present in gravity models because trade flows between relatively
small countries are likely to vary less than between relatively large countries. As
heteroskedasticity only affects the efficiency of the OLS estimator, often OLS point
estimates are given along with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (as in Rose,
2004). However, as Silva and Tenreyro [2006], p. 644 pointed out, even if a
gravity equation is correctly specified, in the presence of heteroskedasticity the OLS
estimators of the coefficients of its log-linear version can still be seriously biased.
For this reason, Silva and Tenreyro warned against log-linearized regressions in
general in favor of the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) method. This
estimator is consistent so long as the conditional mean of the dependent variable is
correctly specified, even if the data is not Poisson distributed. Silva and Tenreyro
estimated a cross-sectional gravity equation of aggregate export flows between 136
countries in 1990 without and with exporter- and importer-specific fixed effects and
showed that the PPML parameter estimates differ considerably from those generated
by other methods, and that all methods except PPML produce some point estimates
with illogical signs and bewildering asymmetries between the effects of importer and
exporter country characteristics.
Several of these preceding issues were dealt with by Liu [2007]. For example, he
warned that if GATT/WTO membership is a catalyst for new trading relationships,
then bilateral trade is less likely to be zero between GATT/WTO members than
between non-members, so the dismissal of the non-random zero trade flows results in
sample selection bias. Still, the fact that Rose (2004) found GATT/WTO ineffective
15 This conclusion is not specific to 1986, Helpman et al. [2008] obtained similar results
when the gravity equation was augmented with year fixed effects and re-estimated for
the 1980s.
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at the intensive margin is puzzling and might indicate the failure of the traditional
approach to gravity modeling based on log-linear regressions. According to Liu, the
Tobit approach does not resolve this problem because in the presence of non-normal
or heteroskedastic errors it might perform even worse than the traditional approach.
Instead, the gravity equation should be estimated in its non-linear multiplicative form
with NLS, PPLM or gamma pseudo-maximum likelihood (GPML) with allowance for
heteroskedasticity.
The empirical analysis in Liu [2007] was based on a panel data set of real imports
of 210 countries or regions from 1948 and 2003. This huge data set was used to
estimate a standard gravity equation in various ways: as a pooled log-linear regression;
log-linear regression with country-pair fixed and random effects; random effect Probit
and Tobit regressions; and Poisson regressions with country-pair fixed and random
effects. In order to distinguish the intensive and extensive margins of trade and to
illustrate the impact of zero or missing imports on the results, the gravity equations
were first estimated from the positive trade flows only, and then from a modified
import data set whereby all non-positive (i.e. zero or missing) trade flows were
replaced with zeros.16 The results from the preferred fixed effects Poisson regression
indicated that about one third of world imports can be attributed to the GATT/WTO,
and that 30% of this can be explained by the extensive margin. This latter finding
is in stark contrast with the conclusion of Helpman et al. [2008] that the extensive
margin does not contribute in a major way to the growth of world trade. According
to Liu, this discrepancy is mainly due to the fact that the sample period of Helpman
et al. is much shorter and excludes the 1950s and 1960s when the growth on the
extensive margin was the most prominent.
Finally, in a summary study, Martin and Pham [2008] find that the PPML
method advocated by Silva and Tenreyro [2006] is indeed the best option for the
estimation of gravity models when heteroskedasticity is the only problem. However,
it performs poorly and yields severely biased estimates when zero trade flows are
frequent. The Heckman maximum likelihood estimator appears to cope far better
in the presence of strong identifying exclusion restrictions. As an illustration, they
borrowed the data set from Silva and Tenreyro and found that their preferred
estimation method yields estimates that are much more similar to the ones obtained
from the traditional approaches, like truncated OLS, than to the ones produced by
PPML.
16 Heteroskedasticity was accounted for by Huber-White standard errors, and in the
traditional log-linear regression every trade flow was increased by one.
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To sum up, none of the follow-up studies confirmed Rose’s bewildering result
and offer various explanations for his apparent lack of a positive relationship between
bilateral trade and GATT/WTO membership. Although we agree with most of
the assessments of these follow up studies, it is still possible that Rose’s (2004)
negative finding is specific to the actual dataset he used and to the choice of the
dependent variable. We believe that, in spite of all the potential short-comings of his
methodology as noted in subsequent critiques, the positive impact of GATT/WTO
on trade should reveal itself quite straightforwardly. For this reason, we turn our
attention to a new, updated international trade data set, presented in the next section.
4. A New Data Set
An important question is how robust Rose’s principal conclusion is to alternative
model specifications, estimation methods, and to the choice of dependent variable?17
According to Rose, the answer for the first and second parts of this question is a
definite yes. The third part, however, cannot be addressed using Rose’s downloadable
dataset18 because it contains many secondary data but not the original raw data
and is therefore unsuitable for three-dimensional (i.e., exporter, importer, and time)
analyses. In particular, it has average bilateral trade values and many (country-
combined) variables which cannot be traced back to the original country-specific
measurements. Another shortcoming of Rose’s dataset is that it does not contain
zero trade flows so it cannot be used to study the extensive margin of trade. For
these reasons we created a new data set. Although we tried to make it as similar to
Rose’s as possible, there are several important differences.
Our sample period dates from 1960 (as opposed to 1948), which coincides with the
start of the fifth (Dillon) round of GATT; so as to assure homogeneity of measurements
as far as possible. As previously mentioned, Rose (2004) obtained population and
GDP data from three different sources: the Penn World Table; the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators; and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
These data sources, however, are not directly comparable (especially not the first
to the latter). By focusing on the sample period from 1960 to 2005 we can collect all
population and real GDP data from a single source (the 2006 edition of the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-ROM).
Rose obtained some of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) observations
from (UN) sources not available to the general public and then somewhat arbitrarily
17 Although Rose [2004], p. 111 mentioned that “It is possible that GATT/WTO accession
has different effects on exports and imports”, he did not pursue this idea.
18 http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm #Software.
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extended them backwards and forwards for the numerous missing periods. Given the
uncertainty surrounding GSP, we dropped this variable from our data set. We also
decided to omit the CNAT variable as in Rose’s sample it is equal to one in only
0.02% of all cases and, unsurprisingly, always turned out to be insignificant.
The remaining variables are defined as per Rose, with the exception of:
REXPORTijt: Real exports of country i to country j in year t (f.o.b., 2000 US$);
RIMPORTijt: Real imports of country i from country j in year t (c.i.f., 2000 US$).
LLOCKi, LLOCKj: Dummy variables for landlocked country (1 = country i (j is
landlocked);
ISLANDi, ISLANDj: Dummy variables for island country (1 = country i (j is an
island nation);
ISCOLijt: Dummy variable for colonizing (1 = country i is the colonizer of country
j in year t);
EV COLij : Dummy variable for ever colonized (1 = i ever colonized j).
From these variables we generated ART , and the country-pair specific versions of
EV COL and ISCOL.
Trade flows reported by the exporting countries often differ from the correspond-
ing trade flows reported by the importing countries. The discrepancies are partly due
to the fact that exports are usually recorded as f.o.b. and imports as c.i.f. values, but
they might also originate from the different qualities of the exporting and importing
countries’ trade statistics. In any case, gravity model estimates might be sensitive to
the choice of export or import flows. According to Piermartini and Teh [2005], p. 46),
by-and-large import data are more reliable than export data. However, since they
are based on c.i.f. prices, in import gravity equations (as in Liu [2007]), distance and
all other explanatory variables that are related to transport costs might be correlated
with the error term. For this reason we perform all subsequent analyses on export
and import flows alike.
Most of our updated data came from the same sources as Rose’s. In particular,
the data on exports and imports were obtained from the December 2006 edition of
the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics CD-ROM. These nominal trade values (given
in US dollars) were deflated by the US CPI (all items, city average, 2000 = 100) taken
from the December 2006 edition of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD-
ROM. The population and real GDP data (in constant 2000 US dollars) were obtained
from the 2006 edition of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-ROM
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and then updated from the World Bank’s website.19 The lists of GATT/WTO mem-
bership, economic communities and free trade agreements (trade blocks and bilateral
trade agreements) were downloaded from the World Trade Organization’s website20
and from Wikipedia.21 Data on colonization were also collected from Wikipedia. The
list of mostly spoken languages in each country is from the CIA’s World Factbook.22
Distances between trading countries were estimated as the averages of great circle
distances (in nautical miles) between 1-3 major cities.23 Other geographical data
(lists of island countries, landlocked countries, and land borders) are from the CIA’s
World Factbook and from Wikipedia.
Our data set includes 27 variables for 180 countries and 46 years (1960-2005),
so there are potentially 1,482,120 (ijt) cases. However, not all 180 countries existed
throughout the sample period and the size of our data set is also limited by the
availability of GDP observations. For the remaining 947,846 cases the data on all
explanatory variables is complete, but there are still 275,901 missing REXPORT
and 274,158 missing RIMPORT observations. Unfortunately, we do not have any
information about these missing values and it is impossible to tell whether the
corresponding countries traded with each other at all. There are also 278,273
zero REXPORT and 257,402 zero RIMPORT observations, which are either genuine
zeros, or are rounded figures and represent nominal flows below half a million US$.
This leaves us with 393,672 positive REXPORT and 416,286 positive RIMPORT
observations.
There is no agreement in the trade literature on how to handle zero and
missing trade observations. For example, while Helpman et al. [2008] treated zero
trade observations as missing values, Felbermayr and Kohler [2006] replaced missing
observations with zero trade flows. In this paper we consider the zero and missing
trade flows as conceptually different. A zero means that for the given year there
was no positive export/import flow recorded between the two countries or that the
nominal value of exports/imports was less than half a million US$. As regards the
missing values, we accept the lack of information and do not assume that the missing
19 http://web.worldbank.org.
20 http://www.wto.org.
21 http://en.wikipedia.org.
22 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
23 Great circle distances were calculated from latitudes and longitudes of major cities taken
from the AlmanacsofInfoplease (http://www.infoplease.com) using the formula from
the web site of PearsonSoftwareConsulting (http://www.cpearson.com/excel/latlong.htm).
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trade flows are equal to zero. Moreover, unlike some other researchers, we do not
make any attempt to estimate these missing values either.24
5. Gravity Models
In this section we use our new data set to estimate numerous versions of “standard”
gravity models. An important difference from Rose (2004), however, is that we study
exports and imports separately and we do not restrict the characteristics of the local
and target countries to have identical impacts on the bilateral trade between them.
For both dependent variables we consider three sets of regressions. We start with
simple OLS regressions with period fixed effects: for positive trade flows only (as in
Rose [2004]; and for all available zero and positive trade flows. As the results clearly
indicate the importance of zero observations, we estimate all subsequent models on
the full sample. Next, we estimate Logit regressions for zero versus positive trade
flows to see whether the models that explain the magnitudes of trade flows differ
from the models that explain its existence. Finally, we estimate Tobit regressions in
order to allow for censoring of trade flows at zero.
Each OLS, Logit and Tobit regression on the full sample is estimated with and
without unobserved specific effects. In particular, we consider four specifications:
no specific effects; period effects only; period and separate local and target country
effects (after Matyas [1997, 1998]; and period and ‘ordered’ country-pair effects (after
Hummels and Levinsohn [1995]). According to Egger [2000], both simple intuitive
arguments and empirical evidence based on Hausman’s χ2-test suggest that in most
applications these unobserved effects are better treated as fixed, so whenever it is
feasible, we use a fixed effects (FE) approach. As regards separate local and target
country fixed effects versus country-pair fixed effects, although in principle country-
pair fixed effects are more flexible, we prefer the country fixed effects as they require
only 360 country dummy variables while the country-pair fixed effects necessitate
32,220 country-pair dummies. Moreover, while the country dummies are perfectly
correlated with all time invariant exporter and importer country variables (LANDi,
LANDj , LLOCKi, LLOCKj, ISLANDi, ISLANDj), the country-pair dummy
24 Missing GDP and trade data is a problem in empirical research in general, but they
are particularly hampering in studies focusing on the relationship between international
trade and conflicts. For this reason, on the basis of some strong but hardly verifiable
assumptions, Gleditsch [2002] attempted to estimate missing data from observations
available for similar countries or periods. While in conflict research missing data
might indeed constitute a more serious problem than the list-wise deletion of all cases
where GDP and/or trade flows are unavailable, we still prefer listwise deletion because
incorrect assumptions in general might result in seriously biased estimates.
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variables are perfectly correlated not only with these variables but also with the time
invariant country-pair variables (CLANGij , CBOARDij , EV COLij , COMCOLij),
further diluting the economic content of the gravity model.
For the sake of brevity, we do not report constants or fixed effects, nor the overall
F- and Wald χ2-test results (which are always strongly significant. Unless stated
otherwise, the reported standard errors are Huber-White standard errors clustered
for country pairs.25
The Standard Approach
The “traditional” OLS results for exports and imports with period FE are presented
in Table 2. The dependent variable is the logarithm of exports, or imports, when only
strictly positive trade flows are used, but each trade flow is increased by one when all
available zero and positive trade observations are used in the estimation.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
It is clear from the results that the inclusion of the zero trade observations is
critical. The most profound discrepancy is that when zero flows are excluded, quite
inexplicably, the coefficients of ONEIN and BOTHIN are both significantly negative,
i.e., GATT/WTO membership appears to generate a negative impact on both exports
and imports. On the other hand, when zero flows are included these coefficients
become significantly positive. For this reason, despite the issues surrounding the zero
trade observations, we perform all subsequent analyses on the full sample.
The export and import OLS regressions without and with FE (period only, period
and country, period and country-pair) are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here.]
All-in-all, the models fit the data well and none of the significant coefficients
have a perverse sign. Crucially, apart from the exports regression with period and
country FE, the coefficients of the ONEIN and BOTHIN membership dummies
are always significantly positive. They suggest that, exports are about 90% (no FE),
178% (period FE), 35% (period and country-pair FE) higher between a member and a
non-member country, and 300% (no FE), 257% (period FE), 51% (period and country
FE), 127% (period and country-pair FE) higher between two member countries than
between two non-member countries. Similarly, imports are about 119% (no FE), 108%
(period FE), 35% (period and country FE), 45% (period and country-pair FE) higher
between a member and a non-member country, and 358% (no FE), 320% (period FE),
25 All models were estimated with Stata/SE 10.0. The unreported results are available
on request.
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102% (period and country FE), 174% (period and country-pair FE) higher between
two member countries than between two non-member countries.
Including the period FE (whilst jointly significant) has only a marginal impact
on the results; it slightly alters the point estimates but not their signs or significances.
The country and country-pair FE, however, appear more important. In particular, the
fact that the ONEIN and BOTHIN coefficients are much larger in the regressions
without country or country-pair FE suggests that in these cases these coefficients
pick-up some of the effects of certain omitted variables which are captured by the
country and country-pair FE.
Comparing the export and import regressions, the most noticeable difference is
that both ONEIN and BOTHIN seem to have a larger impact on bilateral imports.
Otherwise the corresponding sets of results are qualitatively quite similar except that:
i) without FE or with only period FE, a landlocked country appears to export more
than a similar country with direct access to sea, and exports from a landlocked country
appear to be significantly smaller than that from a similar country with direct access
to sea, but being landlocked seems to have no significant impact on imports; and ii)
with period and country FE, export flows between a GATT/WTO member and a
non-member country seem to be no different from that of between two non-member
countries, whereas import flows between a member and a non-member country are
significantly greater than between two non-members.
ISCOL is the only variable which is insignificant across all specifications, so
current colonial relationship does not appear to influence bilateral trade. This might
be due to the fact that we mainly study the post-colonialism era and in our sample
there are only 35 active colonial ties in 1960 and none by 2000 (in the subsequent
Logit and Tobit regressions however, ISCOL is mostly significant).
Recall that, as with Rose, we deflated all bilateral nominal export and import
data by the US consumer price index (for all items averaged across all major cities)
irrespective of the partner countries. This is clearly not an ideal solution, although
it would be an enormous task to apply country or country-pair specific deflators. It
is possible, though, to choose other deflators which are possibly more appropriate to
many economies than the US CPI, such as the price index for emerging and developing
economies, the world commodity price index (WCPI) for metals, WCPI for food, and
WCPI for agricultural raw materials. In order to study the sensitivity of the results,
we re-estimated all equations with period FE using real trade volumes based on these
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four alternative deflators.26 The quantitative results (not reported) are unaffected,
although the coefficients of ONEIN and BOTHIN (whilst still significantly positive)
are 2 to 14 percent smaller than the ones reported in the FE: Period columns of Tables
3 and 4.
We conducted Wald tests on each regression to check whether the corresponding
local and target country coefficients significantly differ and found that when both
coefficients are significant individually they are significantly different from each other
as well, supporting our decision not to impose equality on them. Nevertheless, for the
sake of comparison, we also estimated a specification similar to Rose’s (2004), and
found further support to the expected positive impact of GATT/WTO membership
on bilateral trade. In fact, compared to the separate export and import regressions,
this impact appears to be even stronger, while the effects of the other regressors are
smaller.
The Logit Approach
As seen in Table 2, the gravity models estimated exclusively from positive trade flows
yield perverse results, calling for the consideration of the extensive margin of trade as
well. Thus we now turn our attention to the factors that contribute to the existence
(or not) of bilateral trade.
We created two dummy variables, REXPORT CODE andRIMPORT CODE,
for positive versus zero export and import flows, and estimated binary Logit models
without and with FE. The results are summarized in Tables 5 and 6.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here.]
As before, the period FE does not substantially affect results. Moreover, the
Logit results without FE and with only period FE are qualitatively similar to the
corresponding OLS results. Exceptions are now that the partner country’s real GDP
per capita is significant in the export equation; being landlocked has a significantly
positive coefficient in the import equation; and that (puzzlingly) a current colonial
relationship seems to reduce the likelihood of bilateral trade. Most importantly,
however, the Logit coefficients of ONEIN and BOTHIN are both significantly
positive, that is the estimated probability of two countries trading with each other
increases by the number of GATT/WTO members in the dyad.
26 These price indices were obtained from the December 2006 edition of the IMF’s
InternationalF inancialStatistics CD-ROM. The results based on these deflators are
not reported in this paper.
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Turning to the remaining two pairs of Logit regressions, it is clear that the
presence of country and country-pair FE is critical. They not only change most of
the coefficients considerably, but some significance levels as well. In particular, in
the export equation with period and country FE, BOTHIN is insignificant while
the coefficient of ONEIN is significantly negative, suggesting that the estimated
probability of trading is smaller between a GATT/WTO member and a non-member
country, than either between two non-member countries or between two member
countries. In the export equation with period and country-pair FE and in the
import equation with period and country FE, ONEIN becomes insignificant but
the coefficient of BOTHIN is still significantly positive, so two member countries are
more likely to trade with one another than two non-member countries or a member
and a non-member country.
Finally, although in the export equations the coefficient of the local country’s
GDP is either insignificant or significantly negative, due to the significantly positive
and relatively large coefficient of GDP per capita, real GDP of the local country still
has a significantly positive impact on the likelihood of bilateral trade.
The Tobit Approach
In our sample about 40 percent of all non-missing trade flows are zero. Given this high
proportion, we finally estimate Tobit regressions based on left censoring at zero.27
However, due to estimation problems, instead of a Tobit model with period and
country-pair FE, we consider a specification with period fixed effects and country-
pair random effects (RE).28 The results are shown in Tables 7 and 8.
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 here.]
In each case, the coefficients of ONEIN and BOTHIN are significantly positive,
so GATT/WTO membership clearly has a strong positive impact on trade.ljAlthough
in the ‘FE : period, and RE : country − pair’ cases only the unadjusted standard
errors are available, they are so small for ONEIN and BOTHIN that even if
27 Rose also estimated a Tobit regression, but still rejected any economically substantial
effect of the GATT/WTO on trade. As his data set did not contain zero trade flows
he experimented with Tobit regression only by replacing the smallest 5 percent of the
sample trade observations by zero. This proportion of zeros, however, is far too low
and therefore casts doubts on Rose’s (2004) conclusions.
28 According to Stata Help xtTobit, “There is no command for a conditional fixed-effects
model, as there does not exist a sufficient statistic allowing the fixed effects to be
conditioned out of the likelihood. . . . Unconditional fixed-effects Tobit models may
be fitted with Tobit command with indicator variables for the panels. . . .However,
unconditional fixed-effects estimates are biased.” According to Green [2004], the small
T bias of the ML estimator disappears quickly in T (which here is “large”).
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clustering inflated them tenfold, our conclusion would remain the same. The export
and import regressions are again similar to each other qualitatively, apart from a few
minor differences.
All in all, the standard, Logit and Tobit approaches all imply very similar
conclusions. Namely, the most important factors behind bilateral exports and imports
are the real GDPs of the partner countries, the geographical distance between them,
and our main focus variable(s), their GATT/WTO membership.
6. Conclusion
On the basis of close to eighty variants of a standard gravity model of bilateral trade
estimated for 175 countries over 1948 and 1999, Rose [2004], p. 112) concluded that
“Even if one believes that the GATT/WTO acts as an immeasurable trade-promoting
externality, we do not know that the multilateral system has stimulated trade.”
Since this finding is inconsistent with the fact that many countries are ready to
pay huge “prices” for membership, it is not surprising that it invited many criticisms
concerning, for example, pooling developed and developing countries, not discerning
non-member countries that are bound by GATT/WTO agreements, ignoring relative
trade barriers, potential endogeneity bias, considering only the intensive margin of
trade, and the log-linearised specification of model employed. Although most of these
criticisms are pertinent, in our opinion the key problem is that Rose’s data set contains
only positive average trade flows. To rectify this shortcoming, we created a new
international trade data set, mostly from the same sources as Rose, which importantly
contains zeros as well and, also, separate bilateral export and import flows.
Using a specification similar to Rose’s [2004], we estimated standard, Logit and
Tobit gravity models. For the sake of comparison, in the first case we used not
only the full sample but also the sub-sample(s) of the strictly positive trade flows
as well (clearly, the other models/estimation techniques are not identified on the
positive flow only samples). However, the OLS results obtained from this sub-sample
seemed dubious as they implied that GATT/WTO membership has a negative impact
on international trade. On the other hand, the standard, Tobit and Logit gravity
equations estimated from all available zero and positive trade observations clearly
imply that GATT/WTOmembership encourages international trade, most likely both
among member countries and with non-member countries. Although our study differs
from Rose’s, both in terms of the sample and model specification, the conflicting
results based on the positive flows and on all flows suggest that Rose’s negative
19
finding is most likely due to his omission of zero bilateral trade flows, supporting the
criticisms of Helpman et al. [2008] and Felbermayr and Kohler [2006].
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Table 1: Rose’s (2004) benchmark results 
Dependent Variable: ln ARTijt 
Coefficient (standard error) 
Default
b
 
Country 
fixed effects
c
 
ONEINijt -0.06 (0.05) 0.05 (0.04) 
BOTHINijt -0.04 (0.05) 0.15 (0.05) 
ln (RGDPit  RGDPjt) 0.92 (0.01) 0.16 (0.05) 
ln (RGDPit / POPit  RGDPjt / POPjt) 0.32 (0.01) 0.54 (0.05) 
ln DISTij -1.12 (0.02) -1.31 (0.02) 
ln (LANDi  LANDj) -0.10 (0.01) 0.38 (0.03) 
CLANGij 0.31 (0.04) 0.27 (0.04) 
CBORDij 0.53 (0.11) 0.28 (0.11) 
NLLOCKij  -0.27 (0.03) -1.54 (0.32) 
NISLANDij 0.04 (0.04) -0.87 (0.19) 
EVCOLij 1.16 (0.12) 1.27 (0.11) 
COMCOLij 0.58 (0.07) 0.60 (0.06) 
ISCOLijt 1.08 (0.23) 0.72 (0.26) 
CNATij -0.02 (1.08) 0.31 (0.58) 
MUNIijt 1.12 (0.12) 1.19 (0.12) 
RTAijt 1.20 (0.11) 0.94 (0.13) 
GSPijt 0.86 (0.03) 0.70 (0.03) 
   
R
2
 0.65 0.70 
Note: a) The sample period is from 1948 through 1999, the number of countries is 175, and the 
number of observations is 234,597. 
 b) Both specifications also include period fixed effects, but they are not reported in this table. 
Slope estimates in bold are significant at the five percent level. The numbers in the parentheses 
are Huber-White standard errors robust to clustering by country-pairs. 
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Table 2: OLS Regressions with Period Fixed Effects for Export and Import Flows 
Independent  
Variables 
Coefficient (standard error) 
Exports Imports 
Positive All Positive All 
ONEINijt -0.441 (0.049) 0.578 (0.078) -0.359 (0.049) 0.733 (0.078) 
BOTHINijt -0.421 (0.052) 1.272 (0.854) -0.304 (0.051) 1.434 (0.085) 
ln (RGDPit) 1.074 (0.011) 1.980 (0.020) 0.955 (0.010) 1.439 (0.020) 
ln (RGDPjt) 0.897 (0.010) 1.565 (0.020) 1.059 (0.010) 2.015 (0.019) 
ln (RGDPit / POPit) 0.041 (0.013) 0.206 (0.026) -0.059 (0.013) 0.293 (0.026) 
ln (RGDPjt / POPjt) -0.067 (0.013) 0.027 (0.026) 0.032 (0.012) -0.028 (0.027) 
ln (DISTij) -0.949 (0.019) -2.174 (0.038) -0.932 (0.018) -2.023 (0.038) 
ln (LANDi) -0.087 (0.008) -0.244 (0.017) -0.109 (0.008) -0.167 (0.016) 
ln (LANDj) -0.109 (0.008) -0.165 (0.017) -0.083 (0.008) -0.209 (0.016) 
CLANGij 0.364 (0.031) 0.658 (0.060) 0.344 (0.029) 0.618 (0.059) 
CBORDij 0.989 (0.088) 1.674 (0.230) 0.905 (0.090) 1.448 (0.221) 
LLOCKi 0.040 (0.036) 0.286 (0.073) -0.229 (0.035) 0.077 (0.072) 
LLOCKj -0.465 (0.034) -0.568 (0.070) -0.031 (0.035) 0.036 (0.069) 
ISLANDi -0.031 (0.037) 0.059 (0.069) -0.015 (0.035) 0.203 (0.068) 
ISLANDj 0.049 (0.038) 0.174 (0.072) 0.065 (0.034) 0.282 (0.071) 
EVCOLij 0.812 (0.105) 1.599 (0.237) 1.150 (0.118) 2.757 (0.266) 
COMCOLij 0.284 (0.047) 1.138 (0.088) 0.359 (0.045) 1.123 (0.087) 
ISCOLijt 0.762 (0.255) -1.237 (1.461) 0.924 (0.307) -0.285 (1.410) 
MUNIijt 1.138 (0.072) 1.906 (0.158) 1.057 (0.071) 1.619 (0.148) 
RTAijt 0.771 (0.038) 1.152 (0.087) 0.746 (0.039) 1.085 (0.085) 
     
R
2
 0.630 0.545 0.642 0.533 
n 393672 671945 416286 673688 
Notes: a) The dependent variable is ln(REXPORT) or ln(RIMPORT) for positive trade flows and 
ln(REXPORT+1) or ln(RIMPORT+1) for all available, i.e. zero and positive trade flows. 
b) The sample period is from 1960 through 2005, the number of countries is 180, and n denotes 
the total sample size. Slope estimates in bold are significant at the five percent level. 
c) Each group of fixed effects is significant at any reasonable level. 
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Table 3: OLS Regressions for Export Flows 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient (standard error) 
FE 
No Period 
Period and 
Country 
Period and 
Country-Pair 
ONEINijt 0.643 (0.076) 0.578 (0.078) 0.053 (0.067) 0.299 (0.067) 
BOTHINijt 1.387 (0.081) 1.272 (0.854) 0.412 (0.079) 0.819 (0.080) 
ln (RGDPit) 1.988 (0.020) 1.980 (0.020) 1.302 (0.143) 1.805 (0.139) 
ln (RGDPjt) 1.574 (0.020) 1.565 (0.020) 2.335 (0.135) 2.558 (0.137) 
ln (RGDPit / POPit) 0.203 (0.026) 0.206 (0.026) 0.073 (0.131) -0.523 (0.126) 
ln (RGDPjt / POPjt) 0.025 (0.026) 0.027 (0.026) -1.159 (0.127) -1.444 (0.130) 
ln (DISTij) -2.169 (0.038) -2.174 (0.038) -2.430 (0.042)  
ln (LANDi) -0.254 (0.016) -0.244 (0.017)   
ln (LANDj) -0.175 (0.016) -0.165 (0.017)   
CLANGij 0.648 (0.060) 0.658 (0.060) 1.000 (0.064)  
CBORDij 1.667 (0.231) 1.674 (0.230) 1.378 (0.250)  
LLOCKi 0.315 (0.072) 0.286 (0.073)   
LLOCKj -0.543 (0.070) -0.568 (0.070)   
ISLANDi 0.045 (0.069) 0.059 (0.069)   
ISLANDj 0.161 (0.072) 0.174 (0.072)   
EVCOLij 1.581 (0.238) 1.599 (0.237) 1.459 (0.274)  
COMCOLij 1.137 (0.088) 1.138 (0.088) 1.378 (0.083)  
ISCOLijt -1.349 (1.461) -1.237 (1.461) -1.135 (1.422) -2.629 (1.437) 
MUNIijt 1.812 (0.156) 1.906 (0.158) 1.085 (0.147) 0.231 (0.122) 
RTAijt 1.232 (0.087) 1.152 (0.087) 1.016 (0.084) 0.369 (0.075) 
     
R
2
 0.544 0.545 0.615 0.456 
Notes: a) The dependent variable is ln(REXPORT+1). The country fixed effects are separate 
local and target country fixed effects and the country-pair fixed effects are ordered, i.e., ij is 
distinguished from ji. 
 b) The sample period is from 1960 through 2005, the number of countries is 180, and the sample 
size is 671,945.  
 c) Slope estimates in bold are significant at the five percent level. Each group of fixed effects is 
significant at any reasonable level, except the local country effects in the ‘period and country’ 
case.  
 d) In the ‘period and country-pair’ case R2 is the between R2 statistic and it is incomparable to 
the other three R
2
 statistics. 
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Table 4: OLS Regressions for Import Flows 
 
Independent  
Variables 
Coefficient (standard error) 
FE 
No Period 
Period and 
Country 
Period and 
Country-Pair 
ONEINijt 0.784 (0.076) 0.733 (0.078) 0.299 (0.067) 0.371 (0.065) 
BOTHINijt 1.522 (0.081) 1.434 (0.085) 0.704 (0.079) 1.007 (0.076) 
ln (RGDPit) 1.443 (0.020) 1.439 (0.020) 1.743 (0.137) 2.144 (0.106) 
ln (RGDPjt) 2.018 (0.019) 2.015 (0.019) 2.308 (0.135) 2.911 (0.112) 
ln (RGDPit / POPit) 0.295 (0.026) 0.293 (0.026) -0.457 (0.125) -0.691 (0.118) 
ln (RGDPjt / POPjt) -0.025 (0.027) -0.028 (0.027) -1.117 (0.128) -1.632 (0.122) 
ln (DISTij) -2.022 (0.038) -2.023 (0.038) -2.235 (0.042)  
ln (LANDi) -0.172 (0.016) -0.167 (0.016)   
ln (LANDj) -0.213 (0.016) -0.209 (0.016)   
CLANGij 0.613 (0.059) 0.618 (0.059) 1.009 (0.064)  
CBORDij 1.448 (0.222) 1.448 (0.221) 1.208 (0.241)  
LLOCKi 0.097 (0.071) 0.077 (0.072)   
LLOCKj 0.053 (0.069) 0.036 (0.069)   
ISLANDi 0.189 (0.068) 0.203 (0.068)   
ISLANDj 0.271 (0.071) 0.282 (0.071)   
EVCOLij 2.746 (0.266) 2.757 (0.266) 1.719 (0.297)  
COMCOLij 1.122 (0.087) 1.123 (0.087) 1.361 (0.083)  
ISCOLijt -0.344 (1.411) -0.285 (1.410) -0.881 (1.400) -2.692 (1.429) 
MUNIijt 1.531 (0.146) 1.619 (0.148) 0.949 (0.136) 0.156 (0.120) 
RTAijt 1.127 (0.084) 1.085 (0.085) 0.970 (0.083) 0.387 (0.074) 
     
R
2
 0.532 0.533 0.597 0.456 
Note: a)  The dependent variable is ln(RIMPORT+1). The country fixed effects are separate local 
and target country fixed effects and the country-pair fixed effects are ordered, i.e., ij is 
distinguished from ji. 
b) The sample period is from 1960 through 2005, the number of countries is 180, and the sample 
size is 673,688. 
c) Slope estimates in bold are significant at the five percent level. The fixed effects are jointly 
significant at any reasonable significance level. 
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Table 5: Logit Regressions for Export Flows  
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient (standard error) 
FE 
No Period 
Period and 
Country 
Period and 
Country-Pair 
ONEINijt 0.403 (0.032) 0.330 (0.033) -0.107 (0.033) 0.024 (0.025) 
BOTHINijt 0.825 (0.033) 0.665 (0.035) 0.003 (0.041) 0.121 (0.030) 
ln (RGDPit) 0.720 (0.010) 0.705 (0.010) -0.137 (0.080) -0.408 (0.053) 
ln (RGDPjt) 0.554 (0.009) 0.540 (0.009) 0.656 (0.073) 0.860 (0.052) 
ln (RGDPit / POPit) 0.088 (0.011) 0.102 (0.011) 0.818 (0.076) 1.390 (0.051) 
ln (RGDPjt / POPjt) 0.045 (0.011) 0.056 (0.011) -0.058 (0.070) -0.122 (0.049) 
ln (DISTij) -0.898 (0.019) -0.909 (0.019) -1.255 (0.022)  
ln (LANDi) -0.123 (0.007) -0.101 (0.007)   
ln (LANDj) -0.079 (0.007) -0.058 (0.007)   
CLANGij 0.196 (0.025) 0.226 (0.025) 0.441 (0.029)  
CBORDij 0.857 (0.137) 0.903 (0.138) 0.871 (0.150)  
LLOCKi 0.233 (0.029) 0.174 (0.029)   
LLOCKj -0.115 (0.029) -0.160 (0.030)   
ISLANDi 0.008 (0.029) 0.034 (0.029)   
ISLANDj 0.042 (0.030) 0.061 (0.029)   
EVCOLij 1.075 (0.166) 1.057 (0.164) 0.573 (0.187)  
COMCOLij 0.455 (0.037) 0.472 (0.037) 0.610 (0.038)  
ISCOLijt -1.918 (0.459) -1.711 (0.448) -1.811 (0.492) -5.024 (1.052) 
MUNIijt 0.611 (0.077) 0.772 (0.080) 0.450 (0.082) 0.130 (0.050) 
RTAijt 0.784 (0.047) 0.629 (0.049) 0.634 (0.046) -0.131 (0.030) 
     
Pseudo R
2
 0.352 0.358 0.456  
Note: a) The dependent variable is REXPORT_CODE, a dummy variable for positive and zero 
export flows. The country fixed effects are separate local and target country fixed effects and the 
country-pair fixed effects are ordered, i.e., they distinguish ij from ji. 
b) The sample period is from 1960 through 2005, the number of countries is 180, and the sample 
size is 671,945.  
c) Slope estimates in bold are significant at the five percent level. The fixed effects are jointly 
significant at any reasonable significance level. 
d) Pseudo R
2
 is not available in the ‘period and country-pair’ case. 
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Table 6: Logit Regressions for Import Flows 
Independent  
Variables 
Coefficient (standard error) 
FE 
No Period 
Period and 
Country 
Period and 
Country-Pair 
ONEINijt 0.435 (0.030) 0.362 (0.031) 0.013 (0.031) 0.095 (0.024) 
BOTHINijt 0.859 (0.031) 0.697 (0.033) 0.161 (0.040) 0.267 (0.029) 
ln (RGDPit) 0.459 (0.009) 0.442 (0.009) 0.316 (0.072) 0.128 (0.049) 
ln (RGDPjt) 0.711 (0.009) 0.700 (0.009) 0.418 (0.076) 0.438 (0.049) 
ln (RGDPit / POPit) 0.177 (0.011) 0.193 (0.011) 0.414 (0.067) 0.992 (0.045) 
ln (RGDPjt / POPjt) -0.018 (0.011) -0.008 (0.011) 0.132 (0.071) 0.157 (0.046) 
ln (DISTij) -0.792 (0.018) -0.805 (0.019) -1.085 (0.021)  
ln (LANDi) -0.075 (0.007) -0.053 (0.007)   
ln (LANDj) -0.106 (0.007) -0.084 (0.007)   
CLANGij 0.184 (0.025) 0.214 (0.025) 0.425 (0.028)  
CBORDij 0.701 (0.120) 0.741 (0.122) 0.770 (0.131)  
LLOCKi 0.178 (0.029) 0.126 (0.029)   
LLOCKj 0.109 (0.027) 0.056 (0.028)   
ISLANDi 0.077 (0.028) 0.095 (0.029)   
ISLANDj 0.099 (0.030) 0.129 (0.030)   
EVCOLij 1.438 (0.166) 1.430 (0.164) 0.578 (0.168)  
COMCOLij 0.415 (0.036) 0.436 (0.036) 0.559 (0.037)  
ISCOLijt -1.255 (0.487) -1.047 (0.475) -1.243 (0.441) -2.952 (0.466) 
MUNIijt 0.459 (0.072) 0.620 (0.075) 0.357 (0.073) 0.171 (0.047) 
RTAijt 0.730 (0.045) 0.576 (0.047) 0.592 (0.043) 0.009 (0.030) 
     
Pseudo R
2
 0.325 0.333 0.425  
Note: a) The dependent variable is RIMPORT_CODE, a dummy variable for positive and zero 
import flows. The country fixed effects are separate local and target country fixed effects and the 
country-pair fixed effects are ordered, i.e., they distinguish ij from ji. 
b) The sample period is from 1960 through 2005, the number of countries is 180, and the sample 
size is 673,688.  
c) See Note c of Table 5. 
d) See Note d of Table 5. 
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Table 7: Tobit Regressions for Export Flows 
Independent  
Variables 
Coefficient (standard error) 
FE FE: Period 
RE: Country-
pair No Period 
Period and 
Country 
ONEINijt 1.796 (0.146) 1.598 (0.149) 0.713 (0.128) 1.373 (0.048) 
BOTHINijt 2.925 (0.151) 2.568 (0.157) 1.145 (0.143) 2.094 (0.054) 
ln (RGDPit) 2.921 (0.034) 2.890 (0.034) 4.027 (0.238) 3.451 (0.032) 
ln (RGDPjt) 2.273 (0.033) 2.242 (0.033) 4.736 (0.225) 2.883 (0.032) 
ln (RGDPit / POPit) 0.227 (0.041) 0.244 (0.042) -1.760 (0.221) -0.806 (0.038) 
ln (RGDPjt / POPjt) 0.017 (0.042) 0.031 (0.042) -2.683 (0.211) -1.023 (0.037) 
ln (DISTij) -3.163 (0.062) -3.184 (0.062) -3.471 (0.070) -3.492 (0.059) 
ln (LANDi) -0.379 (0.026) -0.344 (0.027)  -0.608 (0.027) 
ln (LANDj) -0.260 (0.026) -0.224 (0.026)  -0.519 (0.027) 
CLANGij 0.871 (0.097) 0.912 (0.097) 1.411 (0.109) 1.295 (0.101) 
CBORDij 1.809 (0.366) 1.854 (0.361) 1.463 (0.387) 2.050 (0.316) 
LLOCKi 0.563 (0.121) 0.453 (0.122)  0.448 (0.119) 
LLOCKj -0.820 (0.119) -0.914 (0.119)  -0.912 (0.117) 
ISLANDi -0.091 (0.112) -0.042 (0.112)  0.493 (0.123) 
ISLANDj 0.096 (0.116) 0.140 (0.116)  0.975 (0.124) 
EVCOLij 1.011 (0.387) 1.092 (0.380) 1.452 (0.430) 0.872 (0.504) 
COMCOLij 1.967 (0.141) 1.974 (0.142) 2.264 (0.138) 1.599 (0.144) 
ISCOLijt -0.736 (1.921) -0.212 (1.909) -0.069 (1.882) -1.845 (0.465) 
MUNIijt 2.393 (0.241) 2.687 (0.246) 1.864 (0.231) 0.287 (0.074) 
RTAijt 1.578 (0.135) 1.271 (0.136) 0.984 (0.133) -0.374 (0.044) 
     
Pseudo R
2
 0.123 0.123 0.148  
Note:  a) The sample period is from 1960 through 2005, the number of countries is 180, the 
number of observations is 671,945, and the number of left-censored observations is 278,273. 
b) Slope estimates in bold are significant at the five percent level. The fixed effects are jointly 
significant at any reasonable significance level, and the random effects are supported by the 
likelihood ratio test. 
c) In the ‘FE: period, RE: country-pair’ cases the standard errors are the usual unadjusted 
standard errors and the Pseudo R
2
 is unavailable. 
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Table 8: Tobit Regressions for Import Flows 
Independent  
Variables 
Coefficient (standard error) 
FE FE: Period 
RE: Country-
pair No Period 
Period and 
Country 
ONEINijt 1.907 (0.136) 1.736 (0.138) 1.064 (0.121) 1.477 (0.046) 
BOTHINijt 3.010 (0.141) 2.705 (0.146) 1.576 (0.137) 2.257 (0.052) 
ln (RGDPit) 1.967 (0.031) 1.941 (0.031) 3.774 (0.224) 2.462 (0.030) 
ln (RGDPjt) 2.847 (0.031) 2.825 (0.031) 4.825 (0.215) 3.386 (0.030) 
ln (RGDPit / POPit) 0.445 (0.040) 0.457 (0.040) -1.557 (0.202) -0.315 (0.035) 
ln (RGDPjt / POPjt) -0.119 (0.040) -0.113 (0.040) -3.039 (0.203) -1.336 (0.036) 
ln (DISTij) -2.808 (0.058) -2.824 (0.058) -3.034 (0.065) -2.987 (0.055) 
ln (LANDi) -0.242 (0.024) -0.212 (0.024)  -0.433 (0.025) 
ln (LANDj) -0.312 (0.024) -0.285 (0.025)  -0.631 (0.025) 
CLANGij 0.784 (0.091) 0.817 (0.091) 1.374 (0.102) 1.172 (0.095) 
CBORDij 1.563 (0.333) 1.591 (0.329) 1.334 (0.357) 1.878 (0.298) 
LLOCKi 0.237 (0.112) 0.147 (0.113)  0.291 (0.112) 
LLOCKj 0.122 (0.111) 0.041 (0.112)  -0.224 (0.109) 
ISLANDi 0.204 (0.105) 0.241 (0.105)  0.820 (0.115) 
ISLANDj 0.204 (0.108) 0.247 (0.108)  1.014 (0.116) 
EVCOLij 3.056 (0.404) 3.120 (0.399) 1.905 (0.456) 2.268 (0.465) 
COMCOLij 1.841 (0.133) 1.849 (0.133) 2.095 (0.131) 1.389 (0.135) 
ISCOLijt 0.412 (1.884) 0.851 (1.873) 0.189 (1.947) -1.809 (0.458) 
MUNIijt 1.885 (0.219) 2.166 (0.223) 1.516 (0.206) 0.233 (0.071) 
RTAijt 1.397 (0.125) 1.158 (0.126) 0.946 (0.124) -0.056 (0.043) 
     
Pseudo R
2
 0.115 0.116 0.138  
Note: a) The sample period is from 1960 through 2005, the number of countries is 180, the 
number of observations is 673,688, and the number of left-censored observations is 257,402. 
b) See Note b of Table 7. 
c) See Note c of Table 7. 
 
 
 
 
